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Abstract This paper studies the effects of immigrant networks on the bilateral FDI of France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, and, for Italy and Spain, also of the emigrant diasporas. It analyses 
the effects of skilled and unskilled immigrants and of networks linked to developing and developed 
countries. Results show that the FDIs of the UK, Germany and France are affected by the networks of 
skilled immigrants, while those of Italy and Spain are prompted only by the emigrant diasporas. 
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Trust matters. Modern technology allows instant, cheap communication. Yet although anyone can place a long-
distance call, not anyone knows whom to call, or whom to trust. Ethnic networks can address this problem. ‘The 




From the mid nineteenth to the mid twentieth century, Western Europe was a land of emigration, 
while more recently it has become a major destination area for international migrants. In modern 
history, no other part of the world has had such large and varied movements of populations, first 
outwards and then inwards. The question is, how does this affect the European economy, and more 
specifically, does it influence its market interactions with the rest of the world?   
Since formal barriers to international economic exchanges have gradually come down over the last 
few decades, informal impediments have become apparent. Recent literature has shown that the latter 
are due to social, cultural and institutional differences between countries, and have significant negative 
effects on transactions (Trefler, 1995; Obsfeld and Rogoff, 2000). A counteracting force that tends to 
lower these invisible barriers are the migrant communities, which typically build links between their 
origin and destination countries. More precisely, they develop transnational networks where information 
on opportunities concerning the origin and destination economies circulates more easily and efficiently 
than through the international price system (reviews are in Rauch, 2001; Wagner et al., 2002). Networks 
also exert social control over the actions of their members, which reduces opportunism and the risks 
associated with international transactions (Granovetter, 1973).    
Empirical research has focused especially on the influence of networks on international trade (a 
partial list includes Gould, 1994; Head and Ries, 1998; Rauch and Trindade, 2002; Blanes, 2006; 
Wagner, Head and Ries, 2002; Murat and Pistoresi, 2009b; Tadesse and White, 2008), but some studies 
have analysed their impact on foreign direct investments (FDI) (Gao, 2003; Tong, 2005; Buch et al., 
2006; Murat and Pistoresi, 2009a). Both lines of research have provided evidence in support of the basic 
hypothesis that migrant networks smooth international economic transactions and, where this is the   3
case, Western Europe could benefit from the transnational ties built by its immigrant and emigrant 
networks.  
This paper addresses this issue by investigating the relationship between migrant networks and the 
bilateral FDIs of five European countries – France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK – with the 
countries of origin and destination of immigrants and emigrants. In particular, we focus on the separate 
influence of skilled and unskilled immigrants, the specific effects of skilled immigrants originating from 
developed and developing countries and, finally, the influence of emigrant networks on the FDIs of 
Italy and Spain.  
The skills-based distinction arises from the hypothesis that skilled immigrants may have a higher 
impact on the bilateral FDI than the whole migrant network. As investments abroad are more complex, 
costly and risky than pure trade, and more likely to be affected by larger information asymmetries, it 
seems reasonable to think that higher levels of skills and educational attainment can be required to 
overcome these barriers. El Yaman, Kugler and Rapoport (2007), Kugler and Rapoport (2007), Javorcik 
et al. (2006),  Docquier and Lodigiani (2009) and Docquier and Rapoport (2007) find evidence in 
support of this hypothesis.  
Another implication of the networks theory is that migrant links should be more effective when they 
help to overcome the higher invisible barriers that exist between more dissimilar countries. Girma and 
Yu (2002) and Dunlevy (2006) find empirical support for this proposition when examining the bilateral 
trade of the UK and the US respectively. The five countries we investigate are OECD members, which 
may find higher institutional and cultural barriers in the transactions with the less developed non-OECD 
countries. If this is so, the effectiveness of the ties built by migrant networks should be higher when 
they are related to non-OECD rather than OECD countries.  
Our main findings are that the FDIs of France, Germany and the UK are affected by the links of 
immigrants, but those of Spain and Italy in particular depend on the ties with their respective diasporas. 
These different network mechanisms may be related to the past histories of international migration and 
the economic expansion of the two groups of countries. The splitting of immigrant stocks into skilled   4
and unskilled individuals reveals a pattern that is consistent with previous studies: skilled immigrants 
generally have a positive, and in most cases significant, influence on bilateral FDI, while unskilled 
immigrants often have non-significant or negative effects. The further division of skilled immigrants 
into OECD and non-OECD networks shows that both tend to have positive effects, with no general 
prevalence of non-OECD networks.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section II presents the main issues and the descriptive statistics; 
Section III describes the empirical model; Section IV illustrates the data; Section V shows the main 
results of the regressions and in Section VI we offer our conclusion. The Appendix contains the detailed 
regressions for each country and the list of partner economies considered in each dataset. 
 
II. Migrant networks, diasporas and investments abroad 
Western Europe has a relatively short history of immigration. It became noticeable in the UK, France 
and Germany as of the Fifties and Sixties in particular, and has rapidly increased since then. Initially, 
immigrants arriving into the UK were mainly from the Commonwealth, those arriving into France were 
mainly from Southern Europe and the former colonies, and those arriving into Germany were mainly 
from other European countries and the Middle East. Immigration in Italy and Spain is a more recent 
phenomenon, but it has grown so rapidly over the last two decades that the share of immigrants in terms 
of the overall population is now quite significant.
1 Today, Western Europe attracts migration from all 
over the world. 
Table 1 contains some descriptive statistics, based on the data used in our empirical analysis,  related 
to the latest census year in each country. Among the countries we investigated, Germany has the biggest 
immigrant community, with almost 6.4 million individuals, while Italy has only 1.1 million. The 
country with the highest number of skilled immigrants is the UK, with nearly one million highly-
educated immigrant individuals, representing 33% of the foreign-born population. Italy, on the other 
hand, had only around 123,000 skilled immigrants, making up 13.8% of the immigrant population.  
                                                 
1 Foreign individuals represent the 5.6% of the total population in France, 8.2% in Germany, 4.6% in Italy, 9.5% in Spain 
and 5.2% in the UK (OECD International Migration Outlook, 2005).    5
When we disaggregate immigrants according to their country of origin’s membership to the OECD, 
we see that in France and in the UK, the immigrants’ native countries are equally divided into OECD 
members and non-member states. Germany has the largest OECD share, while the opposite occurs in 
Italy and Spain, where non-OECD immigrants are the vast majority. Less than 10% of these individuals 
in Italy are highly skilled. In the UK, however, the share of skilled individuals among the immigrant 
population from non-OECD countries is more than three times as high.  
Emigration from Europe is a much less recent phenomenon. For about a century and until World War 
II, people from the UK, France and Germany emigrated because of their countries’ colonial and 
economic expansion abroad.
2 Mass migration from Italy and Spain, on the other hand, occurred because 
of the lack of work opportunities at home, and mainly took place between 1870 and 1970 in Italy; in 
Spain it persisted until the 1980s, at which point it gradually subsided (Del Boca and Venturini, 2005). 
Unlike the former three countries, Italy and Spain have built and still maintain close links with their 
diasporas. Emigrants and their offspring can maintain citizenship of their home countries and hold the 
right to vote in parliamentary elections. Also, Italian emigrants have had their own parliamentary 
representatives since 2006. The governments of both countries keep detailed official records of the 
diasporas, which include the years of registration of emigrants and their progeny in each foreign country 
of residence. This makes this paper’s analysis on emigrant stocks feasible, because we utilize data 
extracted from these records. As far as the distribution of emigrants is concerned, Table 1 shows that 
Italians abroad reside in OECD countries more than Spanish ones (78.5% against 46.2%). Our data 
show that immigration and emigration are independent variables through both time and space: the 
correlation coefficients between the two are -0.072 for Italy and 0.081 for Spain. This lack of 
correlation mirrors the different time periods in which each phenomena took place and the different 
directions of the old emigration and the recent immigration movements: emigrant communities are 
                                                 
2 Emigration from the three countries had different characteristics. People that permanently emigrated from the UK during 
the last centuries have mostly merged with the host country populations. At the other extreme, the existence of old German 
communities abroad is still quite perceptible but their institutional links with the homeland are weak. The same applies to 
French emigration, with the further difference (in respect to the first two countries) that it was never a mass movement 
(Sowell, 1996).   6
mainly present in OECD member states, Latin America and, for the Italian ones, in Australia and South 
Africa, while immigrants largely originate from Africa, Eastern Europe, Asia and, in part, Latin 
America.  
Bilateral FDIs have substantially increased with the globalization of the world markets. The UK, 
France and - to a lesser degree - Germany, have, however, longer and better-established histories of 
investing abroad and hosting foreign investments. As is shown in Table 1, the FDI stocks of these three 
countries, especially the outward investments, are much larger than those of Spain and Italy. The Table 
also confirms the well known phenomenon that higher barriers or lower economic opportunities hinder 
the flow of investments going from the rich to the developing countries. In our data, there is a strong 
clustering of the five countries’ FDIs, both inward and outward, within the group of OECD economies: 
above 90% of the bilateral FDIs of our countries takes place with other member states, the only 
exception being the Spanish outward FDI, one third of which are directed to non-OECD countries.  
 
III. The empirical specification 
The choice of variables of the base gravity model draws on a literature that distinguishes between 
‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ models of foreign investments. Here, firms invest horizontally to sell the 
same goods sold at home abroad, and make vertical investments to exploit relative factor endowment 
differences. Horizontal FDIs are generally supposed to take place between similar countries while the 
opposite applies to vertical FDIs (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). This is suited for our analysis, 
which distinguishes between developed and developing countries. Following Markusen and Maskus 
(2002) and Gao (2003), we include the sum of the GDP of the countries considered (tgdp) as an 
indicator of the size of the economies, the squared difference of GDPs (sq_gdpdiff) as a measure of 
similarity, and the difference in per capita GDP (pcgdpdiff), which corresponds to the variables' positive 
difference (zero otherwise) between the sending and receiving countries as a proxy of differences in 
relative factor endowments. In this literature, the horizontal model is consistent with a positive 
coefficient of tgdp (since the level of the transactions between two countries is supposed to be higher   7
the bigger the economic dimension of the two), a negative coefficient of sq_gdpdiff and a negative 
coefficient of pcgdpdiff (since transactions should be higher when differences in the countries’ GDP and 
factor endowments are lower). The vertical FDI model predicts positive coefficients of the two variables 
in differences, the sq_gdpdiff and the pcgdpdiff, and makes no predictions on the coefficient related to 
the size of the market. Another base variable of the gravity model is distance, dist. Calculated as the 
great circle distance between capital cities of the countries of origin and destination of the FDI, it is 
meant to capture all the measurable and invisible transaction costs related to travel and communication, 
but also profitable differences in endowments or market opportunities between the two countries. A 
priori, its coefficient can take both positive and negative values.  
The base model is then augmented with a range of other factors which can, in principle, influence the 
FDI, including the economic characteristics of the origin and host countries, their cultural and 
institutional features and, in particular, our main variables of interest: the international networks of 
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where all variables except dummies and the indexes religion and governance are expressed in 
logarithms; i and t are subscripts for the partner country and year, Dt are time dummies.
 3 
FDIit is the stock of foreign direct investments from the country of origin to the country of 
destination (for outward FDIs, the country of origin is one of the 5 economies under investigation, and 
the host country is the partner i, while for inward FDIs the opposite applies). Openness, the share of 
exports plus imports in each country’s GDP, is an indicator of the countries’ commercial propensity to 
trade. Its relation with the FDI can be of complementarity or substitutability: more integration in the 
world economy and lower trade barriers can foster FDI, but more open markets can also be accessed 
through trade alone: hence we do not formulate a hypothesis on the sign of the coefficient. The set of 
                                                 
3 As in Tong (2005), we define the dependent variable as ln (FDI + 1) to retain observations with zero amount of FDI.    8
indicators we use to control for cultural and institutional similarities between countries includes a 
standardized composite index (governance) to indicate the quality of foreign countries’ institutions, the 
share of Christian religion in each partner country as a proxy for religious and cultural similarity 
(religion),  two dummies capturing the presence of past colonial ties (Dcolotie) and of a common 
language (Dlang) with the foreign economies (for France and the UK), and dummies indicating the 
partner countries’ membership to economic and political regional areas as the European Union of 15 
members (Deu15) and the OECD (Doecd). These dummies are supposed to capture trade and political 
agreements, but also similarities among member countries not picked up by the institutional and cultural 
variables listed above. On the assumption that similarity boosts investments abroad, the expected signs 
of the cultural, institutional and regional variables are positive.  
The model is then further augmented to include our variables of interest (network). In the simplest 
specification, we add in the stock of immigrants from each partner country (immigrants). A subsequent 
specification will also include, for Italy and Spain, the stocks of Italian and Spanish emigrants residing 
in each foreign country (emigrants). Following the theory of networks, emigrants, as well as 
immigrants, are expected to have positive and significant effects on bilateral FDI.  
Because of the complexity of investment operations abroad, the networks of skilled immigrants are 
expected to have a higher impact than those of low-skilled immigrants, for both outward and inward 
FDI. Immigrant stocks are therefore split into skilled (skilled_immi) and unskilled (lowskilled_immi) 
subsets. Skilled individuals are defined as those holding a qualification corresponding to Levels 5 or 6 
of the ISCED 1997 classification, i.e. a tertiary education qualification. We further divide the stocks of 
immigrants into OECD and non-OECD networks. A higher dissimilarity between our five OECD 
countries and the non-OECD economies should make the links of networks related to the latter type of 
countries more effective. When the two variables of immigration and emigration are included among 
the regressors, we expect them both to have positive and significant coefficients. Depending on the 
country's past histories and on the relative strength of emigration and immigration, one of the two 
coefficients can be higher or more significant than the other, but no general assumptions can be made in   9
this respect. We distinguish between OECD and non-OECD emigrants but, because data on emigrants’ 
education levels are not available, we do not split the emigrant stocks into skilled and unskilled. 
A main concern in this kind of empirical analysis is endogeneity, which may arise from the presence 
of omitted variables, simultaneity or reverse causality. For example, the liberalization of restrictions in a 
country may simultaneously attract foreign investments and facilitate emigration (Bhattacharya and 
Groznik, 2008), or workers can be transferred abroad after the opening of a new branch of the firm they 
work for. The literature frequently resorts to fixed effect estimation (see, among others, Combes et al., 
2005; Wagner et al., 2002) or first-differencing (Kugler and Rapoport, 2007) to control for the presence 
of time-constant omitted variables. These techniques would force us to drop time-invariant variables, as 
dist, governance and religion, that are relevant to our analysis and, at the same time, would not solve 
the potential problem of reverse causality. We therefore choose to deal with it by using the instrumental 
variables (IV) estimation approach. We also use time dummies, Dt, to capture a variety of time-variant 
omitted variables that may affect the foreign investments of our countries of interest and of the partner 
economies.  
Following Javorcik et al. (2006), we use the overall stock of immigrants from partner country i living 
in the EU-15 in 1990 as the main instrument for the immigrant stock from i in each of the five 
countries.
4 Since the stocks of immigrants in major destination countries tend to be correlated, the 
instrument should be linked to the size of the immigrant population in each country through the set of 
factors inducing migration, without, on the other hand, being a determinant of each country’s bilateral 
FDI. The share of the aggregate immigrant stock corresponding to each of our five countries seems to 
be sufficiently low not to make the instrument a simple ‘replication’ of the potentially endogenous 
variable: 14% of the foreign-born in the EU-15 lived in France, 33% in Germany, 5% in Italy, 8% in 
Spain, 16% in the UK. Depending on the type of immigration variable to be instrumented (total, skilled 
and unskilled), we employ the corresponding instrument.  
                                                 
4 1990, the earliest year for which this information is available, is either previous or coincides with the first year of the datasets’ time 
spans.   10
A second instrument we use is population density in the origin country, which can be a relevant push 
factor for emigration, because it can denote a possible congestion effect, or the lack of adequate land 
ownership in countries with high shares of rural population (Chojnicki, 2004).
5 
The first stage is therefore: 
 
  t i i it controls dens pop EU immig network ε δ α α α + × + × + × + = _ 15 _ 90 2 1 0                              (2) 
 
where network is the immigrant network variable instrumented, immig90_EU15 is the corresponding 
instrumental variable concerning previous migration to the EU-15, pop_dens is the density of 
population in the partner country, and controls is the set of exogenous variables of the main regression. 
Both instruments are expressed in logarithms, (1) is now the structural equation.  
We cannot control for the potential endogeneity of the emigrant variables with similar instruments 
to those used for immigration because they would be of no use. Instead, we utilize the lagged values of 
the emigrant variable for Italy, the only country for which we have observations. More precisely, we use 
the emigrant stock of Italians who were registered at the Registry of Italian Citizens Residing Abroad 
the first year of its existence, 1990, under the hypothesis that emigration followed a rather stable pattern 
over time.  
Whenever possible, we run both OLS and IV regressions, testing for endogeneity through the 
Hausman test and the test for no correlation between the error terms in the first and second stage 
regressions. For the sake of brevity, we do not show both the IV and the OLS estimates; we show the 
latter when there is no evidence of endogeneity, as it is more efficient, and we present the IV estimates 
when endogeneity is detected. 
 
IV. The Data  
Our study utilizes five different sets of data - one for each of our countries of interest: France, 
Germany, Italy, the UK and Spain - and records extracted from different national and international data 
                                                 
5 The costs of obtaining a national passport in the migrants’ country of origin are an additional potential instrument (Javorcik et al., 2006), 
but these data are only available for a small number of the countries we consider.   11
sources. This makes the entire information set wider, however the partner economies and time periods 
considered for each country vary according to the availability of data regarding our main variables of 
interest (details are in the Appendix). Specifically, we include all partner countries with at least one 
observation on the immigrant stock and on either the inward or outward FDI stocks. With this selection 
criterion, the samples are sufficiently representative to prevent concerns regarding sample selection 
bias: the bilateral FDIs included in the Italian dataset amount to about 90% of the country’s total FDI 
while, for the other four countries, the percentage ranges from 96% to 98%.  
The main sources of immigration figures are national censuses and statistics (from ISTAT for Italy, 
INSEE for France, ONS for the UK), the Department for Work and Immigration (Ministerio de Trabajo 
e Inmigraciòn)  for Spain, and the Registry of Foreign Residents for Germany 
(Ausländerzentralregisters, AZR). Information about the immigrant population’s level of educational 
attainment is drawn from the OECD Database on immigrants and expatriates, Total population by 
nationality and country of birth (detailed countries and Population 15+ by nationality, country of birth 
(detailed countries) and educational attainment. The data on the stocks of Italian emigrants are from the 
AIRE (Registry of Italian Citizens Residing Abroad), while those on Spanish emigrants are from the 
CERA (Censo Electoral Residentes Ausentes).  
Figures on bilateral FDIs are taken from Source OECD International Direct Investment Statistics - 
International direct investment by country Vol. 2009 release 01 for France and Italy, from UNCTAD 
WID Country Profiles and National Statistics for Germany and the UK, from the Department for 
Industry, Tourism and Trade (Ministerio de Turismo, Industria y Comercio) for Spain. Data on GDPs in 
current prices and per capita GDPs are from the IMF – World Economic Outlook Database. The 
distance measure is drawn from the USDA-ARS United States Department of Agriculture – Agricultural 
Research Service website. 
Data on the Christian religion share in each country and governance indicators are taken from the 
CIA World Factbook and from World Bank Institute, Governance & Anti-Corruption - Aggregate 
Governance Indicators 1996-2005 respectively. Data on openness are from the A. Heston, R. Summers   12
and B. Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.3, Center for International Comparisons of Production, 
Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, August 2009. Figures used for the instruments in 
the IV approach are from the dataset of Docquier and Marfouk (2006) as far as the stock of immigrants 
in the EU is concerned, from the World Bank – World Development Indicators for population density, 
and from AIRE for the lagged Italian emigrant stock. 
 
V. Key findings  
Table 2 depicts the final regression models, testing the relevance of immigrant networks for both 
inward and outward FDIs for the five countries, while the full set of regressions, run for each country 
following the incremental approach explained above, are included in the Appendix. All the estimates 
depicted in Table 2 are from OLS regressions because tests show that no endogeneity issue arises.
6  
Relatively to the outward FDIs, results regarding the networks of immigrants, our main variables of 
interest,  confirm our prior expectations: more precisely, with the exception of Italy, the FDIs of our 
European countries are significantly influenced by the transnational links of their immigrant 
communities. These effects are depicted in Model 5 for the UK, Model 2 for Germany, Model 4 for 
Spain and, in relation to the aggregate stock, in Table A1 for France.  
In addition, as expected, these ties are stronger and effective when they concern skilled immigrants. 
The variable’s coefficients are positive and significant in the regressions regarding the UK (Model 5), 
Germany (Model 2) and Spain (Model 4), which is consistent with Kugler and Rapoport (2007), 
Javorcik et al. (2006) and Docquier and Lodigiani (2009), and confirms the hypothesis that investments 
abroad are especially boosted by the networks of skilled individuals. On the other hand, no 
homogeneous pattern emerges in relation to unskilled immigrants. The variable’s coefficient is negative 
and significant, although only weakly, just for the UK (Model 5 and Table A5). Negative values, 
                                                 
6 IV estimates are instead provided for the French and German outward FDIs and UK inward FDI when using the aggregate 
stock of immigrants in Tables A1, A2 and A5. Together with Table 3, they show that at least one instrument is positive and 
significant at the 1% level in all IV regressions. The values of the first stage F statistic depict the relevance of the instrument. 
The test shows evidence in favour of the exogeneity of the instruments when both instruments are significant. However, 
when the IV approach is preferable to OLS (as reported in the  Tables), only one of the instruments is significant and we 
cannot implement the J-test for overidentifying restrictions.   13
indicating a possible ‘substitution’ effect between low-skilled immigration and investments abroad have 
also been found by Kugler and Rapoport (2007) for the US and Girma and Yu (2002), in relation to UK 
trade.
7  
Unlike the results of Girma and Yu (2002) and Dunlevy (2006), the assumption that transnational 
networks are more effective when they bridge less similar economies - for the purposes of this paper, 
partner countries not belonging to the OECD group - is not generally supported by our findings. The 
sole exception is Germany (Model 2), where only the non-OECD coefficient is positive and significant, 
with a value of 0.45. For the UK, the OECD and non-OECD immigrant coefficients are both above 1.6, 
with 1% and 5% significance levels, while, for Spain, only OECD immigrants appear to matter, with a 
significance at the 10% level.  
Again we find evidence in the inward equations (Models 6 to 10) in favour of our hypothesis 
concerning the role of immigrant networks, with characteristics that partly replicate those of the 
outward models. In particular, all countries but Italy seem to benefit from the existence of transnational 
links to attract investments from abroad. Also in this case, the bilateral FDI are prompted by the 
networks of skilled immigrants: the variable’s coefficients are positive and significant in the regressions 
concerning the four countries above. Turning now to the OECD, non-OECD partition, for France 
(Model 6), Germany (Model 7) and Spain (Model 9), the networks linked to both these groups of 
countries convey economic opportunities with neither of the two having a clear dominance. More 
specifically, a 1% increase in the foreign-born individuals from OECD and non-OECD countries 
generates an increase by about 4.8% and 2.6% respectively in France, 2.5% and 1.2% in Germany, and 
slightly more than 3% in Spain. Only for the UK, the non-ECD immigrants matter more than the OECD 
ones: a 1% increase in the number of skilled non-OECD foreign-born in the country raises the inward 
FDI by about 12.5%. Again, no clear pattern, if not that of a ‘substitution’ with investments from 
abroad, emerges from the unskilled migrants coefficients. The coefficients of the lowskilled_immi 
                                                 
7 Coefficients on unskilled individuals remain non-significant when disaggregated into OECD and non-OECD, hence Table 
2 depicts only the results concerning the splitting of skilled immigrants. 
   14
variable are negative in the five countries, and are significant only in the regressions regarding 
Germany, at the 10% level (Model 7), and Spain, at the 5% level (Model 9).
 8  
We now consider the additional source of transnational links represented by emigrants, which we can 
analyse for Italy and Spain only. Given the lack of data on skills, the variables are not disaggregated by 
educational attainment. Results are shown in Table 3, where, in all specifications, the coefficients for 
emigration variables are positive and significant for both countries and for the inward and outward 
FDIs, confirming our expectations that the diasporas’ links, despite the bulk of emigration having 
ceased about half a century ago, are still effective. Moreover, the values of the coefficients are even 
higher than those regarding immigration in the group of the other three countries. 
These results, together with those of Table 2, clearly show that, for the Italian firms investing abroad 
and for the foreign firms investing in Italy, these are the only transnational links that count; in Table 2 
above, the coefficients of the immigrant variables were non-significant even without the emigrant 
stocks included in the regressions. Instead, in the specifications of Table 3, a 1% increase in the 
presence of emigrants in partner countries increases the Italian outward FDI by 0.46%, and the inward 
FDI by 0.51%. Similarly to the results concerning immigration, the splitting of the stocks of Italian 
emigrants into emigrants-OECD and emigrants-nonOECD gives positive and significant coefficients in 
both cases and for both the outward and inward FDI (Models 2 and 4 of Table 3), despite the impact of 
the second group appearing to be higher.  
 Immigrant networks appeared to affect Spain’s bilateral FDI in Table 2, where they were the only 
proxy for transnational networking activity, but in Table 3, with the inclusion of the emigrant stocks in 
the regressions, they reveal to be non-robust and lose their significance. Results are that the diaspora 
links have the stronger - and only - influence on the country’s bilateral FDI: these variable’s coefficients 
are significant at the 1% level in all specifications, while those of immigrants, in Table 2, were 
significant only in some specifications and at the 5 and 10% levels. More specifically, in Models 5 to 8 
of Table 3, a 1% increase in the stock of Spanish emigrants abroad leads to a 1.11% increase in the 
                                                 
8 We compute exact percentage variations in predicted FDI as  1 ) ˆ exp( − β .   15
country’s inward FDI. In the outward equations, a 1% increase in emigrants towards OECD countries 
determines a 0.93%  increase in FDI, while for non-OECD networks it raises them by 1.5% (Model 6). 
It can be noted that there is no substantial difference between the effects of OECD and non-OECD 
networks. As with Italy, emigrants residing in both developed and developing countries strongly 
influence the country’s FDI.  
As already stated above, we cannot perform IV regressions for Spain because of the lack of good 
instruments. However, as for Italy, foreign investments are a much more recent phenomenon than 
emigration, which largely dates back to the past century. This would also suggest that the causality 
between emigration and FDI captured in our regressions regarding Spain is not likely to go in the wrong 
direction.  
It might be inferred from the above findings that, were data on emigrants available for the other three 
countries, similar results on diaspora links would apply. However, this would only be valid if their 
emigration phenomena were similar to those of Italy and Spain in terms of width, intensity and strength 
of transnational links, which does not seem to be the case if we look at the respective emigration 
histories. Furthermore, the very absence of comparable registries of the citizens residing abroad for 
these other three European countries seems to reinforce this view. 
Regarding the coefficients of our control variables, Table 2 shows the absence of a homogeneous 
pattern concerning the prevalence of either the horizontal or the vertical model of investments abroad, 
both in the inward and outward equations. The coefficients of tgdp are positive whenever significant, 
but the signs and significance of sq_gdpdiff and pcgdpdiff tend to differ across countries, without giving 
robust evidence in favour of either of the two models. The signs are consistent with the horizontal 
model of investments abroad in the UK regressions, but two out of the three coefficients are not 
significant (Model 5 in Table 2, and also Table A5).  
Some interesting results emerge from the coefficients of the variable distance, dist. Both in the 
inward and outward equations, values are negative and significant in the regressions concerning Italy 
and Spain (Models 3-4 and 8-9), demonstrating that Italian and Spanish firms tend to prefer nearby   16
markets for their investments abroad. On the other hand, the variable has a positive and significant 
impact on the UK’s outward FDI, showing that UK multinationals are willing to invest in faraway 
economies. The same coefficient becomes negative in inward specifications, indicating that the 
country’s FDI from abroad tends to originate from closer states. The level of openness of the partner 
countries does not appear to be particularly relevant, except for the France outward FDI (Model 1) and 
UK inward FDI (Model 10), with opposite signs, but only a weak significance. Membership to the 
EU15 appears to positively affect inward FDI in Italy and Germany, but, again, only weakly in these 
cases; the OECD dummy is never significant, except in some specifications of Tables A1-5.  
The colonial past of the UK, France and Spain emerges from the common language, Dlang, and 
colonial ties, Dcolotie. The former has a positive and significant effect for the outward and inward 
bilateral FDI of Spain, the latter for the outward FDI of France and the inward FDI of the UK. 
Consistently with the findings of Girma and Yu (2002) concerning trade, the coefficient of the dummy 
Commonwealth (Dcolotie in the UK regressions) is negative for the outward FDI of the UK. The level 
of governance of the partner economies positively affects the bilateral FDI of all our countries, except 
in Italy, where, instead, the coefficient of the cultural variable, religion, is positive and significant in 
both the inward and outward equations. It must be noted, however, that the latter result is not robust to 
the inclusion of the emigrant variable into the regressions; Table 3 shows that the influence of the 




This paper has analysed the effects of immigrant networks on the bilateral FDI of five European 
countries and, for two of them, those of the emigrant diasporas. Our main findings are that the countries 
investigated seem to follow two different models: one is based on the links of skilled immigrants and 
involves the UK, France and Germany, the other relies on diaspora ties and concerns Italy and Spain. A   17
common result is that our countries' bilateral FDIs are affected by networks tied to both developed and 
non-OECD countries.  
Why do these two groups of countries differ? The evidence seems to suggest that history matters. 
Past emigration from the UK, France and, in part, Germany followed the colonial and expansionary 
policies of their home countries, while from Italy and Spain it was determined by lack of work 
opportunities at home. These labour emigrants were interested in maintaining strong and institutional 
ties with the home countries, which in turn relied on them for economic operations abroad. On the other 
hand, emigrants from the first three states had weaker ties with the homeland and assimilated more 
easily with the populations of the destination countries.  
The difference between the two models of international economic relations is also captured by the 
different effects of the distance variable on the FDI in our regressions: it is negative for Italy and Spain, 
positive for the UK’s outward investments and non-significant for the France and Germany outward 
FDI. A factor related to these results may be the smaller average dimension of Italian and Spanish firms 
relatively to those of the other three countries.  
While, in principle, both immigrant or emigrant networks may have positive effects on the economy, 
not all outcomes are efficient. In particular, several immigrant communities in Spain and especially in 
Italy originate from the growing and emerging world markets; the ineffectiveness of the links they 
potentially provide may signal situations of missed economic opportunities not necessarily offset by 
those offered by the diasporas. The article from the Economist cited above also reads, ‘[e]thnic 
networks can have drawbacks. If they are a means of excluding outsiders, they can be stultifying’.  
Similarly, policies aiming solely at the restraint of immigration flows can be myopic, they do not 
contemplate the gains that migrant networks can bring to the economy.   18
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 Table 1 - Summary statistics of some variables of interest 
1 
  Inward FDI (mln USD) 
Outward FDI (mln 
USD)  Emigrants 
France                    
Total  240,519 100% 326,346 100%     
OECD  236,496 98.33% 297,167 91.06%     
Non OECD  4,023 1.67% 29,179 8.94%      
Germany                    
Total  274,789 100% 619,990 100%     
OECD  270,120 98.30% 575,956 92.90%     
Non OECD  4,669 1.70% 44,034 7.10%      
Italy                    
Total  105,038 100% 148,270 100%             2.346.249   100%
OECD  103,524 98.56% 138,297 93.27%             1.840.604   78.45%
Non OECD  1,514 1.44% 9,973 6.73% 505.645 21.55%
Spain                    
Total  244,235 100% 194,405 100%             1.050.527   100%
OECD  221,327 90.62% 131,047 67.41% 485.295 46.20%
Non OECD  22,908 9.38% 63,358 32.59% 565.232 53.80%
United Kingdom                    
Total  483,457 100% 811,599 100%     
OECD  474,259 98.10% 751,032 92.54%     
Non OECD  9,198 1.90% 60,567 7.46%      
  Immigrants  Skilled immigrants % skilled immig.
2 
France                    
Total 4,174,651 100% 694,372  17.39% 
OECD 2,044,143 48.97% 275,727 14.06% 
Non OECD  2,130,508 51.03% 418,645 20.61% 
Germany                    
Total 6,386,690 100% 764,206  14.25% 
OECD 4,474,056 70.05% 482,174 12.91% 
Non OECD  1,912,634 29.95% 282,032 17.33% 
Italy                    
Total 1,100,821 100% 122,570  13.79% 
OECD 199,295 18.10% 53,719  29.20% 
Non OECD  901,526 81.90% 68,851  9.77% 
Spain                    
Total 1,573,556 100% 268,890  19.71% 
OECD 396,400 25.19% 99,923  27.99% 
Non OECD  1,177,156 74.81% 168,967 16.77% 
United Kingdom                    
Total 3,260,944 100% 999,224  33.02% 
OECD 1,841,522 56.47% 547,084 32.39% 
Non OECD  1,419,422 43.53% 452,140 33.82% 
1 Data from the five datasets. The size of each sample varies according to data availability.        
Year of reference: latest census for France (1999), Germany and UK (2001); 2002 for Italy, 2003 for Spain. 




 Table 2 - Migrant networks and FDI 
Dependent variable:  Outward FDI  Inward FDI 
Country France  Germany  Italy  Spain  UK  France  Germany  Italy  Spain  UK 
Explanatory variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 
                                       
l_TGDP 3.889  ***  3.270 *** -1.067   2.655 ***  0.303      2.337 **  2.256 ***  -0.194   2.834 ***  2.172  *** 
   (1.413)    (0.558)   (2.339)   (0.908)  (0.947)      (1.089)   (0.745)   (2.944)   (0.726)   (0.597)    
l_sq_GDPDIFF  -0.286     -0.587 *** 0.906    -0.416 *  -0.077     -0.266    -0.544 **  0.486    -0.392 **  -0.253  *** 
   (0.181)     (0.164)    (1.073)    (0.209)    (0.089)     (0.256)    (0.220)    (1.338)    (0.179)    (0.063)    
l_PCGDPDIFF  0.081    0.035  -0.066   0.246 **  -0.149  **  0.262 **  0.230 *** 0.323 ***  0.066   0.102  * 
   (0.095)    (0.046)   (0.060)   (0.119)   (0.068)     (0.105)   (0.061)   (0.102)   (0.144)   (0.054)    
l_DIST  0.195     0.133    -0.644 ***  -0.905 **  0.516  *  -0.040    -0.245    -0.688 **  -1.614 ***  -1.034  *** 
   (0.370)     (0.153)    (0.201)    (0.440)    (0.292)     (0.447)    (0.238)    (0.292)    (0.529)    (0.332)    
l_OPENNESS 0.895  *  0.521   -0.040   -0.401   0.312      0.511   -0.143   -0.640   -1.271   -1.058  * 
   (0.527)    (0.367)   (0.517)   (0.787)   (0.523)     (0.478)   (0.410)   (0.602)   (0.812)   (0.572)    
DEU15  0.513     0.384    0.614    0.944    0.604     0.964    1.073 *  1.128 *  0.715    0.175    
   (1.049)     (0.432)    (0.409)    (0.711)    (0.828)     (0.763)    (0.581)    (0.627)    (1.062)    (0.494)    
DOECD -0.511    1.770   2.035   -1.430   -0.718      -3.881   -4.457   0.501   -1.775   16.250   
   (4.628)    (1.934)   (2.288)   (2.504)   (4.742)     (3.288)   (2.676)   (2.707)   (3.010)   (9.866)    
DLANG  2.427  **            0.693    0.432     0.811              1.218    1.338  * 
   (1.158)               (0.838)    (0.522)     (1.028)              (1.121)    (0.788)    
DCOLOTIE
1 -2.019        2.930 ***  -1.552  *  -0.712       2.108 *  0.837     
   (1.256)        (0.809)   (0.838)     (1.116)       (1.143)   (0.512)    
RELIGION  0.894     0.359    1.251 ***  0.605    0.675     0.009    -0.618    1.279 **  0.666    -1.317    
   (0.796)     (0.383)    (0.408)    (0.937)    (0.744)     (0.763)    (0.617)    (0.576)    (1.198)    (0.939)    
GOVERNANCE 4.752  **  2.868 *** 0.701   6.396 ***  1.617      3.010 **  3.787 **  0.334   5.227 ***  7.411  *** 
   (2.009)    (0.802)   (1.202)   (1.849)   (1.571)     (1.476)   (1.658)   (1.882)   (1.878)   (1.957)    
l_LOWSKILLED_IMMI  0.069     0.002    0.163    -0.669    -0.769  *  -0.615   -0.484 *  -0.228    -1.453 **  -0.630   
   (0.452)     (0.162)    (0.192)    (0.562)    (0.398)     (0.375)    (0.276)    (0.228)    (0.579)    (0.381)    
l_SKILLED_IMMI_OECD  0.610    0.368  -0.253   1.232 *  1.703  **  1.754 ***  1.243 *** 0.017   1.598 **  0.780     
   (0.872)    (0.265)   (0.342)   (0.699)   (0.721)     (0.644)   (0.354)   (0.367)   (0.747)   (0.549)    
l_SKILLED_IMMI_NONOECD  0.647     0.452 **  0.063    0.979    1.648  ***  1.277 ***  0.776 *  0.201    1.414 *  2.603  ** 
   (0.444)     (0.194)    (0.231)    (0.644)    (0.459)     (0.400)    (0.405)    (0.335)    (0.744)    (0.962)    
Time dummies  yes    yes yes yes    yes     yes yes yes yes yes    
const  -57.348  ***  -34.506 *** -0.028    -7.177    -8.403     -31.473 **  -14.283    2.087    5.652    -28.377    
   (19.902)     (8.089)    (5.995)    (8.847)    (14.175)     (15.746)    (9.723)    (6.437)    (7.329)    (18.688)    
Adjusted R²  0.406    0.725   0.652   0.565   0.410     0.543   0.673   0.803   0.670   0.755    
Number of observations  173     1319   177   257   119     173   799   177   197   78    
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant level; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
1 Dummycommonwealth for the UK    Table 3 - Emigration and FDI 
                     
   Italy Spain 
Dependent var.:  Outward FDI  Inward FDI  Outward FDI  Inward FDI 
Specification:  OLS OLS  IV  IV  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
                           
Explanatory var.  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
                                      
l_TGDP  -0.014   0.293    0.703  1.348     1.501 *  1.598 *  1.525 **  1.507 ** 
   (2.318)    (2.391)     (2.686)   (2.858)    (0.789)   (0.811)    (0.618)    (0.590)   
l_sq_GDPDIFF  0.330     0.192     -0.030    -0.325    -0.145    -0.181    -0.141     -0.137   
   (1.081)     (1.118)     (1.209)    (1.295)    (0.150)    (0.152)    (0.095)     (0.096)   
l_PCGDPDIFF  0.009   -0.006     0.260 *** 0.278 *** 0.329 ***  0.295  ***  0.080   0.076    
   (0.062)    (0.063)     (0.094)   (0.100)    (0.084)   (0.072)    (0.125)   (0.132)    
l_DIST  -0.541  ***  -0.547  ***  -0.574 *  -0.583 *  -0.368    -0.391    -1.343  **  -1.344 ** 
   (0.169)     (0.161)     (0.299)    (0.294)    (0.298)    (0.298)    (0.506)     (0.511)   
l_OPENNESS  0.548    0.628     0.008   0.166    0.754   0.815    -1.061   -1.082    
   (0.529)    (0.555)     (0.657)   (0.691)    (0.543)   (0.551)    (0.718)   (0.717)    
DUMMYEU15  0.621     0.633     1.105 *  1.135 *  0.374    0.210    0.627     0.644   
   (0.399)     (0.405)     (0.646)    (0.670)    (0.462)    (0.475)    (0.773)     (0.787)   
DOECD  3.780  *  4.635  *  2.301   3.885    0.931   1.265    -1.496   -1.589    
   (2.203)    (2.574)     (2.456)   (2.992)    (1.756)   (1.876)    (2.481)   (2.580)    
DLANG                        -0.557    -0.622    -0.119     -0.104   
                         (0.656)    (0.651)    (1.004)     (1.022)   
DCOLOTIE                  0.935 *  0.887 *  1.458   1.453    
                   (0.548)   (0.527)    (1.044)   (1.034)    
RELIGION  0.215     0.118     0.177    -0.034    0.433    0.494    -0.109     -0.076   
   (0.536)     (0.558)     (0.745)    (0.829)    (0.756)    (0.745)    (0.943)     (0.995)   
GOVERNANCE  0.155    0.100     -0.595   -0.611    4.074 ***  3.618 **  3.341 *  3.436 * 
   (1.063)    (1.040)     (1.773)   (1.759)    (1.476)   (1.426)    (1.793)   (2.009)    
l_LOWSKILLED  -0.077     -0.051     -0.473 *  -0.441    -0.477    -0.375    -1.182  **  -1.208 * 
    _IMMI  (0.228)     (0.246)     (0.255)    (0.263)    (0.527)    (0.552)    (0.587)     (0.634)   
l_SKILLED_IMMI  -0.056    -0.056     0.223   0.232    0.689   0.730    0.959   0.967    
    _OECD  (0.302)    (0.305)     (0.373)   (0.373)    (0.632)   (0.616)    (0.699)   (0.702)    
l_SKILLED_IMMI  0.432  *  0.434  *  0.577 *  0.600 *  0.646    0.470    0.757     0.806   
    _NONOECD  (0.236)     (0.234)     (0.330)    (0.323)    (0.603)    (0.664)    (0.765)     (0.855)   
l_EMIGRANTS  0.378  ***       0.410 ***    0.824 ***      0.749  ***   
   (0.118)         (0.130)      (0.154)       (0.158)      
l_EMIGRANTS        0.334  **       0.346 **       0.658  ***       0.771 ***
    _OECD        (0.129)          (0.144)         (0.158)          (0.175)   
l_EMIGRANTS      0.437  ***     0.528 ***  0.918  ***      0.723 ***
    _NONOECD      (0.160)         (0.195)     (0.215)          (0.265)   
                                     
Time dummies  yes     yes     yes   yes   yes   yes    yes    yes  
                                                
const  -5.954    -7.098     -3.085   -5.656    -15.786 **  -15.767 **  6.940   7.106    
   (5.940)     (6.564)     (6.270)    (7.260)    (6.732)    (6.650)    (7.411)     (7.410)   
Adjusted R²  0.718    0.718     0.826   0.824    0.682   0.684    0.751    0.750   
N. of observations  177     177     177    177    248    248    189     189   
                                      
Instrumental          Emig.  ‘90  Em. OECD ‘90                  
 variables              Em. NonO. ‘90                  
First-stage F stat.           1444.31   629.73                    
   p-value              0.000    0.000                           
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant level; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.   
 APPENDIX 
Table A1 - Immigrant networks and FDI - France 
                
Dependent var.:  Outward FDI  Inward FDI 
Specification:  IV OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
Explanatory variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
                        
l_TGDP 3.274  ***  3.827 ***  3.889 *** 3.800 ***  3.128    2.337 ** 
   (0.922)    (0.881)   (1.413)    (0.876)   (0.880)    (1.089)   
l_sq_GDPDIFF  -0.245     -0.283   -0.286    -0.305    -0.298     -0.266   
   (0.168)     (0.171)    (0.181)    (0.217)    (0.251)     (0.256)   
l_PCGDPDIFF -0.013    0.079   0.081     0.258 **  0.227    0.262 ** 
   (0.094)    (0.089)   (0.095)    (0.100)   (0.102)    (0.105)   
l_DIST  0.386     0.200    0.195    -0.232    -0.113     -0.040   
   (0.409)     (0.368)    (0.370)    (0.462)    (0.440)     (0.447)   
l_OPENNESS  0.992  *  0.890 *  0.895 *   0.438   0.568    0.511   
   (0.535)    (0.521)   (0.527)   (0.485)   (0.469)    (0.478)   
DUMMYEU15  -0.026     0.489    0.513    1.192    1.258     0.964   
   (0.953)     (0.924)    (1.049)    (0.799)    (0.841)     (0.763)   
DOECD  -1.216    -0.790   -0.511    -0.320   -0.307    -3.881   
   (0.906)    (0.851)   (4.628)    (0.863)   (0.855)    (3.288)   
DLANG  3.020  ***  2.411 **  2.427 **  1.030    1.012     0.811   
   (1.108)     (1.074)    (1.158)    (1.056)    (0.968)     (1.028)   
DCOLOTIE  -2.956  **  -1.997   -2.019    -0.868   -0.992    -0.712   
   (1.272)    (1.147)   (1.256)    (1.139)   (1.018)    (1.116)   
RELIGION  0.865     0.892    0.894    -0.023    0.047     0.009   
   (0.872)     (0.790)    (0.796)    (0.786)    (0.773)     (0.763)   
GOVERNANCE 5.101  **  4.755 **  4.752 **  3.205 **  2.943    3.010 ** 
   (2.064)    (2.007)   (2.009)    (1.483)   (1.477)    (1.476)   
l_IMMIGRANTS  1.014  ***              0.464 **             
   (0.301)                 (0.200)               
l_LOWSKILLED_IMMI       0.059   0.069         -0.483    -0.615  
        (0.385)   (0.452)         (0.334)    (0.375)   
l_SKILLED_IMMI        0.650                1.233          
         (0.427)                (0.399)          
l_SKILLED_IMMI_OECD           0.610             1.754 ***
            (0.872)             (0.644)   
l_SKILLED_IMMI              0.647                1.277 ***
_NONOECD              (0.444)                (0.400)   
                              
Time  dummies  Yes   yes yes   yes  yes   yes  
                              
const  -54.335  ***  -56.503 ***  -57.348 *** -48.791 ***  -42.026     -31.473 ** 
   (12.107)     (12.948)    (19.902)    (13.008)    (12.898)     (15.746)   
                                      
Adjusted R²  0.379    0.413   0.406    0.511   0.542    0.543   
Number of observations  173     173    173    173    173     173   
Instrumental variables  Immig. to EU15 ('90)                      
First-stage F statistic  110.700                       
   p-value  0.000                          
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.    
Table A2 - Immigrant networks and FDI - Germany 
 
Dependent var.:  Outward FDI  Inward FDI 
Specification:  IV  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Explanatory variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
l_TGDP  2.889    3.142 *** 3.270 *** 3.528 *** 2.822  *** 2.256 *** 
   (0.577)    (0.536)   (0.558)    (0.713)   (0.714)    (0.745)   
l_sq_GDPDIFF  -0.596     -0.585 ***  -0.587 ***  -0.613 ***  -0.530  **  -0.544 ** 
   (0.158)     (0.169)    (0.164)    (0.231)    (0.218)     (0.220)   
l_PCGDPDIFF  -0.020    0.030   0.035     0.197 *** 0.191  *** 0.230 *** 
    (0.050)    (0.046)  (0.046)     (0.057)  (0.057)   (0.061)    
l_DIST  0.356     0.146    0.133    -0.398    -0.314     -0.245   
   (0.219)     (0.148)    (0.153)    (0.247)    (0.243)     (0.238)   
l_OPENNESS  0.697    0.523   0.521     -0.315  -0.152   -0.143    
    (0.393)    (0.367)  (0.367)     (0.403)  (0.423)   (0.410)    
DUMMYEU15  -0.012     0.340    0.384    1.051 *  1.210  **  1.073 * 
   (0.446)     (0.422)    (0.432)    (0.606)    (0.554)     (0.581)   
DOECD  0.759    1.077 **  1.770     -0.630  -0.609   -4.457  
    (0.559)    (0.452)  (1.934)     (0.808)  (0.849)   (2.676)    
RELIGION  0.804     0.342    0.359    -0.427    -0.666     -0.618   
   (0.450)     (0.378)    (0.383)    (0.712)    (0.641)     (0.617)   
GOVERNANCE  3.311    2.877 *** 2.868 *** 4.619 *** 4.152  **  3.787 ** 
    (0.859)    (0.800)  (0.802)     (1.698)  (1.783)   (1.658)    
l_IMMIGRANTS  0.609               0.175              
   (0.181)               (0.166)              
l_LOWSKILLED_IMMI      0.000   0.002        -0.473   -0.484 * 
        (0.162)  (0.162)        (0.308)   (0.276)    
l_SKILLED_IMMI        0.441 **            0.902  **      
         (0.191)              (0.368)         
l_SKILLED_IMMI_OECD       0.368            1.243 *** 
         (0.265)            (0.354)   
l_SKILLED_IMMI             0.452 **             0.776 * 
_NONOECD                                 
Time  dummies  yes   yes yes   yes  yes   yes  
const  -33.250     -32.682 ***  -34.506 ***  -29.202 ***  -23.521  ***  -14.283   
   (7.210)     (7.595)    (8.089)    (8.752)    (8.499)     (9.723)   
Adjusted  R²  0.698    0.725  0.725     0.638  0.664   0.673    
Number of observations  1314     1319    1319    799    799     799   
Instrumental variables  Immig. to EU15 ('90)             
First-stage F statistic  43.180          
   p-value  0.000          
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.   
  
Table A3 - Migrant networks and FDI - Italy 
              
Dependent variable:  Outward FDI  Inward FDI 
Specification:  OLS OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS OLS 
Explanatory variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
                         
l_TGDP  0.247    -1.371   -1.067    1.801   -0.380    -0.194   
   (2.131)    (2.258)   (2.339)    (2.613)   (2.900)    (2.944)   
l_sq_GDPDIFF  0.270     0.993    0.906    -0.422    0.541     0.486   
   (1.008)     (1.068)    (1.073)    (1.195)    (1.334)     (1.338)   
l_PCGDPDIFF  -0.024    -0.088   -0.066    0.258 *** 0.336  ***  0.323 *** 
   (0.066)    (0.068)   (0.060)    (0.087)  (0.103)    (0.102)    
l_DIST  -0.470  **  -0.549 ***  -0.644 ***  -0.520 **  -0.631  **  -0.688 ** 
   (0.226)     (0.201)    (0.201)    (0.253)    (0.257)     (0.292)   
l_OPENNESS  0.390    -0.041   -0.040    -0.053   -0.646    -0.640   
   (0.408)    (0.521)   (0.517)    (0.541)   (0.595)    (0.602)   
DUMMYEU15  0.988  *  0.635    0.614    1.342 **  1.141  *  1.128 * 
   (0.543)     (0.421)    (0.409)    (0.608)    (0.642)     (0.627)   
DOECD  -0.395    -0.032   2.035    -1.140 **  -0.700    0.501   
   (0.415)    (0.421)   (2.288)    (0.542)   (0.602)    (2.707)   
RELIGION  1.029  **  1.170 ***  1.251 ***  1.052 *  1.228  **  1.279 ** 
   (0.393)     (0.389)    (0.408)    (0.583)    (0.589)     (0.576)   
GOVERNANCE  0.834   0.357   0.701    1.319  0.147    0.334   
   (1.020)    (1.309)   (1.202)    (1.720)  (1.854)    (1.882)   
l_IMMIGRANTS  0.138               -0.087              
   (0.134)               (0.142)              
l_LOWSKILLED_IMMI       0.217   0.163        -0.196    -0.228   
        (0.183)   (0.192)        (0.222)    (0.228)   
l_SKILLED_IMMI        -0.107              0.101         
         (0.252)              (0.296)         
l_SKILLED_IMMI_OECD        -0.253            0.017   
          (0.342)            (0.367)   
l_SKILLED_IMMI_NONOECD             0.063               0.201   
              (0.231)               (0.335)   
                       
Time dummies  yes    yes yes   yes   yes    yes  
                       
const  -3.414     1.866    -0.028    -3.803    3.088     2.087   
   (5.124)     (5.502)    (5.995)    (5.122)    (5.838)     (6.437)   
                                     
Adjusted R²  0.624    0.648   0.652    0.784   0.803    0.803   
Number of observations  197     177    177    197    177     177   
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant level; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.       
 
  
Table A4 - Migrant networks and FDI - Spain 
                
Dependent variable:  Outward FDI  Inward FDI 
Specification:  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS  OLS 
Explanatory variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
                        
l_TGDP  3.448 ***  2.895 *** 2.655 ***  3.848 ***  2.983 ***  2.834 *** 
   (0.871)   (0.860)   (0.908)     (0.648)   (0.685)   (0.726)   
l_sq_GDPDIFF  -0.463  **  -0.419 *  -0.416 *  -0.443 **  -0.387  **  -0.392 ** 
   (0.232)     (0.217)    (0.209)    (0.194)    (0.182)     (0.179)   
l_PCGDPDIFF  0.219 *  0.240 *  0.246 **  0.112   0.061   0.066    
   (0.115)    (0.121)   (0.119)    (0.119)   (0.145)    (0.144)   
l_DIST  -1.050  **  -0.980 **  -0.905 **  -1.557 ***  -1.671  ***  -1.614 *** 
   (0.428)     (0.445)    (0.440)    (0.508)    (0.513)     (0.529)   
l_OPENNESS  -0.428    -0.354   -0.401    -1.175   -1.188    -1.271   
   (0.784)    (0.790)   (0.787)    (0.846)   (0.836)    (0.812)   
DUMMYEU15  1.220     1.133    0.944    1.341    0.768     0.715   
   (0.792)     (0.791)    (0.711)    (0.929)    (1.023)     (1.062)   
DOECD  0.562    0.361   -1.430    -0.257   -0.432    -1.775   
   (0.759)    (0.782)   (2.504)    (0.990)   (1.030)    (3.010)   
DLANG  1.020     0.819    0.693    1.708    1.314     1.218   
   (0.882)     (0.871)    (0.838)    (1.044)    (1.156)     (1.121)   
DCOLOTIE  3.184 ***  2.892 *** 2.930 ***  2.286 *  2.016   2.108 * 
   (0.870)    (0.850)   (0.809)    (1.219)   (1.211)    (1.143)   
RELIGION  0.924     0.658    0.605    0.699    0.748     0.666   
   (0.890)     (0.933)    (0.937)    (1.233)    (1.212)     (1.198)   
GOVERNANCE  5.735 ***  6.106 *** 6.396 ***  3.910 **  5.128 ***  5.227 *** 
   (1.749)    (1.809)   (1.849)    (1.671)   (1.848)    (1.878)   
l_IMMIGRANTS  0.090               -0.417 *            
   (0.186)               (0.244)              
l_LOWSKILLED_IMMI       -0.667   -0.669        -1.487  **  -1.453 ** 
        (0.559)   (0.562)        (0.560)    (0.579)   
l_SKILLED_IMMI        1.007              1.499  **      
         (0.644)              (0.711)         
l_SKILLED_IMMI_OECD         1.232 *          1.598 ** 
          (0.699)            (0.747)   
l_SKILLED_IMMI_NONOECD             0.979               1.414 * 
              (0.644)               (0.744)   
                       
Time dummies  yes    yes   yes    yes   yes    yes   
                       
const  -10.067     -8.495    -7.177    0.288    4.339     5.652   
   (8.305)     (8.601)    (8.847)    (8.296)    (7.491)     (7.329)   
                                      
Adjusted R²  0.553    0.564   0.565    0.640   0.670    0.670   
Number of observations  261     257    257    201    197     197   
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant level; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.       
  
Table A5 - Immigrant networks and FDI - United Kingdom 
                 
Dependent var.:  Outward FDI  Inward FDI 
Specification:  OLS OLS OLS  IV  OLS OLS 
Explanatory variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
                         
l_TGDP  0.557   0.339   0.303     1.996 ***  1.772 ***  2.172 *** 
   (0.804)    (0.774)   (0.947)    (0.701)   (0.588)    (0.597)   
l_sq_GDPDIFF  -0.091     -0.080    -0.077    -0.365 ***  -0.232  ***  -0.253 *** 
   (0.155)     (0.094)    (0.089)    (0.101)    (0.070)     (0.063)   
l_PCGDPDIFF  -0.192 ***  -0.147 **  -0.149 **  0.091 *  0.130 **  0.102 * 
   (0.069)    (0.067)   (0.068)    (0.051)   (0.051)    (0.054)   
l_DIST  0.706  **  0.517 *  0.516 *  -1.256 ***  -0.837  **  -1.034 *** 
   (0.324)     (0.291)    (0.292)    (0.390)    (0.378)     (0.332)   
l_OPENNESS  0.108   0.308   0.312     -2.170 ***  -1.069 *  -1.058 * 
   (0.597)    (0.542)   (0.523)    (0.559)   (0.626)    (0.572)   
DUMMYEU15  0.847     0.598    0.604    0.534    0.278     0.175   
   (0.808)     (0.826)    (0.828)    (0.502)    (0.532)     (0.494)   
DOECD  0.470   -0.250   -0.718     -1.573   -1.248   16.250  
   (1.206)    (1.291)   (4.742)    (1.066)   (0.917)    (9.866)   
DLANG  0.528     0.410   0.432    3.140 ***  1.199     1.338 * 
   (0.537)     (0.511)   (0.522)    (0.834)    (0.959)     (0.788)   
DUMMYCOMMONWEALTH  -0.958   -1.575 *  -1.552 *  0.302   0.576   0.837    
   (0.830)    (0.918)   (0.838)    (0.619)   (0.583)    (0.512)   
RELIGION  0.284     0.687    0.675    -2.149 **  -0.906     -1.317   
   (0.815)     (0.722)    (0.744)    (1.047)    (0.957)     (0.939)   
GOVERNANCE  0.770   1.688   1.617     8.052 ***  6.886 ***  7.411 *** 
   (1.777)    (1.822)   (1.571)    (1.740)   (1.793)    (1.957)   
l_IMMIGRANTS  0.650  ***              -0.417               
   (0.227)                 (0.297)               
l_LOWSKILLED_IMMI     -0.765 *  -0.769 *        -0.717  **  -0.630  
       (0.388)   (0.398)         (0.350)    (0.381)   
l_SKILLED_IMMI        1.670 ***              1.051  *       
         (0.525)                (0.610)          
l_SKILLED_IMMI_OECD        1.703 **           0.780    
           (0.721)             (0.549)   
l_SKILLED_IMMI              1.648 ***              2.603 ** 
_NONOECD              (0.459)                (0.962)   
Time  dummies  yes   yes yes   yes  yes   yes  
                
Const  -11.059     -9.105    -8.403    6.047    -8.781     -28.377   
   (11.283)     (10.546)    (14.175)    (11.622)    (11.396)     (18.688)   
Adjusted R²  0.369    0.415   0.410    0.696   0.724    0.755   
Number of observations  119     119    119    78    78     78   
Instrumental variables       Immig. to EU15 ('90)    
First-stage F statistic     17.53   
   p-value     0.000   
 
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Appendix - List of partner countries 
France (years: 1990, 1999)        Italy (years: 2002-2005) 
Albania Cyprus  Laos  *  Romania  Albania  Egypt  Luxembourg  Slovenia 
Algeria *  Czech Rep.   Latvia  Russian Fed.   Algeria  France  Malaysia  South Africa 
Angola  Denmark  Lebanon *  Saudi Arabia  Argentina  Germany  Mexico  Spain 
Argentina  Djibouti + *  Libya  Senegal + *  Australia  Greece  Morocco  Sweden 
Australia Egypt  Lithuania  Singapore  Austria  Hungary  Netherlands  Switzerland 
Austria Finland  Luxembourg  Slovak  Rep. Brazil  India  Norway  Thailand 
Belarus  Gabon + *  Madagascar + *  Slovenia Bulgaria  Indonesia  Philippines  Tunisia 
Belgium Germany  Malaysia  South  Africa  Canada  Iran  Poland Turkey 
Benin + *  Greece  Mali + *  Spain  Chile  Ireland  Portugal  Ukraine 
Bolivia  Guinea + *  Mauritania *  Sri Lanka  China   Israel  Romania  UK 
Brazil  Haiti + *  Mauritius *  Sweden  Croatia  Japan  Russian Fed.   United States 
Bulgaria Hong  Kong  Mexico  Switzerland  Czech  Rep.   Korea (South)  Singapore  Venezuela 
Burkina Faso + *  Hungary  Morocco *  Syrian Arab R. *  Denmark  Libya  Slovak Rep. 
Cambodia *  Iceland  Netherlands  Taiwan  Spain (2003-2006) 
Cameroon + *  India *  New Zealand  Thailand  Algeria  France  Mexico +*  Slovak Rep. 
Canada  Indonesia  Niger + *  Togo + *  Argentina +*  Germany  Moldova  Slovenia 
Central Afr. R. + *  Iran   Nigeria  Tunisia *  Australia  Greece  Monaco  South Africa 
Chad + *  Ireland  Norway  Turkey  Austria  Hungary  Morocco*  Sri Lanka 
Chile Israel  Pakistan  Ukraine  Belgium Iceland  Mozambique  Sudan 
China  *  Italy  Panama  UK  Bolivia +*  India  Netherlands  Sweden 
Colombia  Ivory C. +*  Paraguay  United States Brazil  Indonesia  New  Zealand Switzerland 
Comoros *  Japan  Peru  Uruguay  Bulgaria   Iran  Nicaragua +*  Syria 
Congo. Rep. + *  Kazakhstan  Philippines  Venezuela Canada Ireland  Norway  Taiwan 
Congo. Dem.R. *  Kenya  Poland  Vietnam *  Chile +*  Israel  Pakistan  Tanzania 
Costa Rica  Korea (South)  Portugal     China Italy  Panama  +*  Thailand 
Croatia  Kuwait  Qatar     Colombia +*  Jamaica*  Paraguay +*  Tunisia 
Germany (years: 1991-2006)  Costa Rica+*  Japan  Peru +*  Turkey 
          Croatia  Kenya  Philippines*  UK 
Algeria  Egypt  Liberia  Saudi Arabia  Cuba +*  Korea (South)  Poland  Ukraine 
Argentina  El Salvador  Libya  Serbia and Mont. Cyprus  Latvia  Portugal  United Ar. E. 
Australia Estonia  Liechtenstein  Singapore  Czech Rep.   Lebanon  Romania  United States 
Austria Finland  Lithuania  Slovak  Rep.  Denmark  Libya  Russian Fed.  Uruguay +* 
Bangladesh France Luxembourg  Slovenia  Dominic.R+*  Lithuania  Saudi Arabia  Venezuela +* 
Belarus Ghana  Macedonia  South  Africa  Ecuador +*  Luxembourg  Senegal  Vietnam 
Belgium  Greece  Malaysia  Spain  Egypt  Malaysia  Serbia and Mont. 
Bolivia  Guatemala  Malta  Sri Lanka  Finland  Malta  Singapore    
Bosnia-Herzeg. Honduras  Mexico  Sweden  United Kingdom (years: 1990, 1995, 2001) 
Brazil  Hungary  Morocco  Switzerland           
Bulgaria Iceland  Netherlands  Syrian Arab Rep. Australia + °  Finland  Latvia  Russian Fed. 
Cameroon India New  Zealand  Taiwan  Austria  France  Lithuania  Singapore  +° 
Canada Indonesia  Nicaragua  Tanzania  Belgium  Germany   Luxembourg  Slovak Rep.  
Chile  Iran   Nigeria  Thailand  Bermuda +  Ghana + °  Malaysia °  Slovenia 
China   Ireland  Norway  Tunisia  Brazil  Greece  Malta + °  South Afr. +° 
Colombia  Israel  Pakistan  Turkey  Canada + °  Hong Kong +  Mauritius + °  Spain 
Costa Rica  Italy  Panama  Ukraine  Chile Hungary  Mexico  Sweden 
Côte d'Ivoire  Jamaica  Paraguay  UK  China   India + °  Netherlands  Switzerland 
Croatia Japan  Peru United  States  Colombia  Indonesia New  Zealand  +°  Thailand 
Cyprus Kazakhstan  Philippines  Uruguay  Cyprus °  Ireland +  Nigeria + °  Tunisia 
Czech Republic  Kenya  Poland  Uzbekistan  Czech Rep.   Italy  Norway  U.S. + 
Denmark Korea  (South)  Portugal  Venezuela  Denmark  Japan  Panama Zimbabwe  + 
Dominican  R.   Latvia  Romania  Vietnam  Egypt  Kenya + °  Poland    
Ecuador  Lebanon  Russian Fed.    Estonia  Korea (South)  Portugal   
 + Dlang. * Dummycolonialtie. ° Dummycommonwealth 
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